By (Retd) Admiral Arun Prakash |
For nearly six decades after independence, we remained oblivious to the fact that a peninsular country like India, circumscribed by high mountain ranges to its north, is as abjectly dependent on the ocean environment for its trade, security and economic well being, as any island nation. It was the opening up of our economy in the early years of the last decade, and the consequent globalization of trade that triggered a change in perceptions. The realization has slowly begun to dawn on our politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats that the roots of economic prosperity lie in the safety of our maritime trade and energy lifelines, which can only be ensured if maritime security receives due importance.
But has there been a similar awakening in our national security establishment? India’s two sea services: the Indian Navy (IN) and the Coast Guard (CG) have been in the news in recent weeks because of events that have happened virtually at our doorstep in Mumbai, as well as in the distant waters of the Gulf of Aden. The passage of a few weeks since their occurrence has perhaps permitted us the necessary detachment to reflect on them.
Surprise and Intelligence
“Surprise” is one of the Principles of War, first enunciated by the 19th century German strategist Carl von Clausewitz. From the Trojan Horse episode to the Pearl Harbour attack, history has demonstrated that it is a key factor in the success of any well-planned and professionally executed operation. Equally, experience has demonstrated that the obvious antidote to surprise is sound and timely “intelligence”.
In this context, if we reflect briefly on the conflicts that the sub-continent has seen over the past six decades, we will see that starting with the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir a few weeks after Independence, and the 1962 Chinese attacks in NEFA and Ladakh, right up to the infiltration into Kargil heights in 1999, our intelligence apparatus has invariably let us down.
The 26/11 terrorist strikes in Mumbai were simply more of the same, and showed that people like us who fail to learn from history are condemned to re-live it: over and over again. Here, let me attempt to enlighten the ill-informed debate that followed this appalling episode, as a part of the post-facto “blame game” that different agencies seem to consider essential.
An intelligence report can be considered “actionable” only if it clearly contains three elements: WHAT (description), WHERE (position) and WHEN (date and time of detection). In the case of a mobile target (like a ship or aircraft) it needs a fourth ingredient: WHITHER (course and speed). If any of these ingredients is missing or vague, the user would be justified in classifying such intelligence as “unactionable” because pursuing it would not only result in a tremendous waste of effort, but even hazard lives of personnel.
India’s Strategic Naiveté
The ISI obviously plans 10-15 years ahead, and what we have been facing for some years now (and will continue to face), is best termed as “Asymmetric War”; waged by a ruthless and imaginative adversary with no holds barred. This war has many other dimensions, of which we notice only a few. Aiding separatism and insurgency, encouraging demographic invasion, attacking our economy by pumping in fake currency, inciting communal violence, and undermining the morale and cohesion of the armed forces (often through the instrumentality of the Indian media) are some other facets of this multi-pronged assault on the Indian state.
The most obvious manifestation of this asymmetric war has been the cold-blooded orchestration of violence in our urban areas amidst the civilian population. By refusing to recognize this as a war being waged against us, and treating it as a law and order issue, we have aided and abetted forces inimical to the Indian State.
One is not aware of how far ahead our own intelligence agencies look and plan, or whether they have any retaliatory measures up their sleeve. But it is obvious that we have kept the different aspects of these conflicts strictly compartmentalized, and hence our response to the Asymmetric War is disjointed, fragmented and disorganized.
Lessons From Kargil
Within two weeks of the Kargil episode of May-June 1999, in an uncharacteristically speedy decision, the Government of India (GoI) constituted an expert committee, tasked to recommend measures to prevent a recurrence of armed intrusions such as the one that led to this brief Indo-Pak war.
The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) headed by K Subrahmanyam, returned a scathing indictment of the national security system, and pointed out glaring deficiencies in our intelligence services, border management and higher defence organization. The KRC led to the formation of a Group of Ministers (GoM) to examine reforms in the national security system, which in turn commissioned four Task Forces for the examination of different components of the system.
The GoM, working conscientiously under LK Advani, met 27 times and produced its recommendations in the form of a public document (with many security deletions) entitled: “Reforming the National Security System” in February 2001. Against the backdrop of 26/11, it is of great interest to note some of the observations contained in this seven year old document:
• Para 2.32. While the J&K border is still active, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra and the West coast of the country are also being used for the purpose of smuggling arms. The smugglers have acquired high-powered speed boats, which can land at uncharted beaches and creeks.
• Para 5.5. The concept of border security has undergone a sea change with the growing vulnerability of the coastline and also of the airspace. In response to strengthening of security… along a sensitive land border, the transgressor is already on the lookout for soft gaps…along the coast, and if need be, from the air.
• Para 5.51. Little has been done over the years to understand or take action to create the infrastructure for the protection of India’s vast coastal areas.
• Para 5.58. The GoM felt that it was desirable to set up a Specialized Marine Police in all coastal states and island territories.
As in much else relating to this GoM report, it is now amply clear that little note was taken of the above observations, and virtually and no action resulted. Having consequently suffered a “Maritime Kargil” it is perhaps time to plan for future contingencies rather than indulge in infructuous post-mortems. For there can be little doubt that the ISI will strike again; sooner than later.
Where Do We Go From Here?
The biggest lacuna in our system of port and coastal security (if indeed one exists) is the total lack of coordination between the 14 (or more) ministries, departments and agencies (e.g. MoST, MHA, MoD, DG Shipping, ONGC, Customs, Immigration, Fisheries and so on) that have a degree of involvement in maritime related issues. Security compromises take place on an almost daily basis because the left hand does not know what the right is doing. Agencies work at cross purposes, while important harbours like Mumbai remain unguarded and porous. In this context, the GoI needs to urgently examine the following aspects of our coastal security:
• For years, Naval HQ have been pleading with the GoI that there is a dire need to constitute a National Maritime Commission for regulation, coordination and oversight of maritime security. There is intense opposition to this proposal from the bureaucracy in various ministries, purely because they fear loss of turf. The recent Mumbai disaster, has revealed gaping holes in our coastal security, and if this is not reason enough, then the intense public outcry that followed, should provide sufficient motivation for the politicians to override these irrational objections and constitute this umbrella commission.
• Every morning, thousands of fishing boats and trawlers head out to sea from fishing villages in Mumbai and its vicinity, with most returning within 24-48 hours. No amount of vigilance or patrolling by the IN or CG can regulate such a huge volume of traffic. The answer is to legislate the mandatory installation of simple inexpensive electronic transponders on every small vessel plying off our coast. As part of a Vessel and Traffic Management System (VTMS) which includes shore-based radars, this will ensure quick and automatic identification of bona fide Indian fishermen, and the isolation of suspicious vessels.
• Any organization that we evolve to combat the menace of terrorism from the sea will have little utility unless it is endowed with a resident capability to receive, compile and analyze intelligence. Having appreciated the existence of a threat, it should then have forces at its disposal, as well as the communication and logistics facilities to deploy them without delay. At the heart of such an organization would be a Joint Operations Room where a coherent, real time sea-air traffic picture is available at all times. Only the IN has the capability as well as the command & control systems necessary to handle a challenge of this nature, and the GoI should have no hesitation in designating the Commanders-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Eastern and Western Naval Commands to concurrently take charge of the two new “Coastal Commands” being contemplated.
These measures will call for overriding of entrenched bureaucratic opposition, curbing inter-agency turf-battles and cutting of much red-tape. But there is a great deal at stake; and strong, resolute measures are called for. Having dwelt on coastal security, let us now cast a glance at the maritime perils that we face further out at sea.
The Lawless Gulf of Aden
Dominated by the Horn of Africa (HoA), the Gulf of Aden forms a funnel for 24,000 merchant ships annually transiting the Suez Canal carrying energy and raw material to Europe and finished goods to Africa and the Middle East. The abjectly poor Somalian Republic, which occupies most of the Horn, has been in a state of turmoil for nearly two decades, and is only notionally governed by a Transitional Federal Government. The rich Somalian fishing grounds, have for many years, been ruthlessly exploited by foreign poachers, and this is adduced as one of the reasons for deprived local fishermen taking to the lucrative occupation of piracy.
From just 10-15 incidents in 2004, the waters of the Gulf of Aden have seen acts of piracy and hijacking spiral rapidly to 80 in 2008. In an attempt to tackle this menace, the UN Security Council first adopted Resolution 1816 in June 2008, authorizing nations to deploy warships for counter-piracy operations in Somali territorial waters. This was followed by Resolution 1838 in October 2008 urging all maritime states to despatch naval units to fight piracy off the HoA.
The Impediments to Action
Despite two NATO and EU naval task forces and many individual warships having been deployed recently, piracy continues unabated, leading to great unease amongst seafarers world-wide. Should this trend persist, shipping companies and marine insurers will be forced to hike their rates. This could deal a further blow to the tottering world economy, and India will suffer too. According to US Navy sources, about 30% of the hijacked vessels are dhows, either registered in Gujarat or carrying Indian crews. Furthermore, as a major Indian Ocean maritime force, the IN is expected to uphold law and order in its neighbourhood.
Due to legal, jurisdictional and sovereignty issues, maritime nations have been very reluctant to take resolute action against Somalian pirates. India has been an exception, but let me provide a little background..
In February 2006, NHQ learnt that an Indian dhow named Bhakti Sagar registered in Porbandar, had been hijacked by Somali pirates while on passage to Kisamayu, and 25 Indian crew members had been held for a large ransom. Fortuitously, an Indian destroyer had just sailed for home from the Omani port of Salalah, and the navy’s instinctive reaction was to divert the warship to the Somali coast. It was suggested to the crisis management group and the MEA that on arrival the warship could remain outside Somali territorial waters and await developments in the expectation that her presence would have a salutary effect on the ongoing negotiations with the hijackers.
After mulling over the proposal, the MEA posed a significant but revealing question. Would the navy provide a destroyer every time an Indian citizen was in trouble anywhere? The navy’s response was that even if a single Indian citizen was in danger anywhere in the world, and there was a warship in the vicinity, it would be made available. However, while these deliberations were going on, the dhow owner was fortunately able to secure the release of his vessel and crew after negotiating a “reasonable” ransom, and our destroyer was recalled.
The recent episode involving 22 Indian crew members of MV Stolt Valour being released after long captivity on payment of a huge ransom to Somalian pirates was a little different, because the vessel happened to be foreign owned. But the fact remains that we seemed to have learnt nothing from experience, and there was a great deal of fumbling and groping in the MoD and MEA before we could formulate a delayed response.
As a sovereign democracy, India has a clear moral obligation to ensure that the 30 million strong Indian Diaspora, spread world-wide, and a hundred thousand Indian seafarers plying on the high seas, are accorded protection, wherever possible, from pirates and hijackers. Recently, the Captains of INS Tabar, and INS Mysore, by their bold and resolute actions sent out a clear message to the outlaws: “do not mess with Indian ships”. This was in the best traditions of the IN, and has brought international encomiums, not just to the IN, but to the nation.
Conclusion
By virtue of its sheer size, as well as the resilience of its people, India has so far successfully absorbed the determined onslaught of ISI backed terrorism. However, the struggle is far from over, and if our economic progress and developmental programmes are not to be stalled, India must prevail decisively over these forces. The time has therefore come to take an integrated view of these serious threats, and instead of fighting them in piecemeal fashion, to adopt an integrated approach for defence of the homeland.
Yonder on the high seas too, our stakes in terms of economics as well as security, are steadily increasing. The people of India do not expect instant dividends from the annual defence expenditure of Rs. 110,000 crores (and growing) but are certainly asking why the homeland cannot be secured against interlopers coming across the beach, and our citizens protected from lawless elements on the high seas.
The obvious answer is that purchasing military hardware is easy, but attaining the sagacity judgment and resolve required for its timely deployment is what we need to acquire.
